2. (Optional reading) BonJour, Epistemology, Chapter 6. This covers roughly the same material as “Perception Basics”, but in more detail.
3. Martin, Chapter 1
4. (Optional reading) Martin, Chapter 2
5. Huemer, Chapter 1
6. Huemer, Chapter 2
7. (Optional reading) David Hume on perception
8. (Optional reading) Thomas Reid arguing for direct realism
9. BonJour, Chapter 3 (This is the text for the Jan. 17 quiz.)
10. (Optional reading) Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”
11. (Optional reading) Alvin Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing”
12. Kenneth Boyce and Alvin Plantinga, “Proper Functionalism” (Just the first 8 pages.)
13. A nice summary of problems with reliabilism has been posted by Jim Prior of NYU.
14. Robert Nozick, “Knowledge and Scepticism“, from Philosophical Explanations, 1981.
15. My notes on Rationalism in physics
16. BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason, selection.
17. David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Read Section 4, Parts 1 and 2 (pp. 11-18). Depending on your prior knowledge of Hume, you might also want to read Section 2, or some of it.
18. My notes on The Argument from Induction
19. (Optional reading.) BonJour, Epistemology, Chapter 4.
20. My notes on “The Argument for Rationalism from Induction“.
21. (Optional reading) Probability basics.
22. Selection from BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason, Chapter 7. (And a response from Leah Henderson.)
23. Jennifer Nagel, “Shifting Standards“.
24. William Rowley, “Social Epistemology”
25. (Optional reading) Jennifer Nagel, “Testimony“.
26. (Optional reading) W. V. O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” (selection)
27. (Optional reading) Jaegwon Kim, “What is naturalized epistemology?” (selection)
28. (Optional reading) Allen Wood, “Relativism“.
29. (Optional Reading) Thomas Kuhn, “Objectivity, Value Judgement and Theory Choice“.
30. (Optional Reading) BonJour “The Myth of Knowledge“. Here BonJour argues for a JTB theory where the J must be infallible, and says that the idea of fallibly justified knowledge is a myth.
31. (Optional Reading) Helen Beebee, “Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction“. Beebee argues that views that see laws as necessary in some way (e.g. Armstrong and Ellis) don’t help to solve the problem of induction. 🙁
32. Linda Alcoff, “On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?”, selection.
33. Helen Longino, Selection.
34. Lorraine Code, “Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant?”