

Gödel's 1st incompleteness theorem (1931)

$\neg \exists x \text{ ProofOf}(x, g)$

Kurt Gödel's achievement in modern logic is singular and monumental—indeed it is more than a monument, it is a landmark which will remain visible far in space and time. ... The subject of logic has certainly completely changed its nature and possibilities with Gödel's achievement.

— John von Neumann



Gödel as a student (age 19)

The Gödel sentence

- Gödel proved that **PA₁** (the theory generated by the Peano axioms in FOL) is **incomplete**, since there are true sentences of arithmetic that are not consequences of the first-order Peano axioms.
- He proved this by the simple means of writing down an FOL sentence of arithmetic, and showing it to be both true and unprovable.
- The Gödel sentence says, in effect, “I am unprovable”
 - Assuming the Peano axioms are true, and the rules of inference F+ are sound, **the Gödel sentence must be both true and unprovable.**

Add names and functions to FOL

Numerals: 0 , $s(0)$, $s(s(0))$, $s(s(s(0)))$, etc.

Define $+$, \times using $s(x)$.

$$m + 0 = m$$

$$m + s(n) = s(m + n)$$

$$m \times 1 = m$$

$$m \times s(n) = (m \times n) + m$$

Peano axioms in FOL

- A1. 0 is a natural number
- A2. Every number x has a unique successor $s(x)$.
- A3. $\forall x \, s(x) \neq 0$
- A4. $\forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x=y)$
- A5. $[F(0) \wedge \forall y (F(y) \rightarrow F(s(y)))] \rightarrow \forall x \, F(x)$.

Gödel numbers of FOL symbols

()	0	s	\neg	\vee	\wedge	\rightarrow	\leftrightarrow	\forall	\exists	x	y	z	=
1	3	5	7	9	11	13	15	17	19	21	23	25	27	29

Gödel numbers of symbol strings

The Gödel number of a string of symbols (e.g. a wff or a sentence) is obtained by concatenating the Gödel numbers of each symbol making up the formula, putting a '0' after each number as a separator. (N.B. The Gödel number of Axiom 4 is 49 digits!)

E.g. Axiom 4: $\forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \rightarrow x=y)$

\forall	x	\forall	y	(s	(x)	=	s	(y)	\rightarrow	x	=	y)
190	230	190	250	10	70	10	230	30	290	70	10	250	30	150	230	290	250	30

Gödel numbers of *lists* of strings

- To obtain the Gödel number of a **list** of formulas, write the Gödel numbers of the formulas in order, separating them by two consecutive zeros.
- Since a proof is just a sequence of FOL sentences, this method assigns a Gödel number to each proof.

Gödel “arithmetized” syntactic relations and properties

- An *arithmetical* property is a property of natural numbers, e.g. *prime* number, *even* number, number greater than 6, etc.
- Gödel showed that syntactic properties, like: *x is a sentence of FOL*, *x is a formal proof in F+ of y*, etc. can be reduced to arithmetical properties of the corresponding Gödel numbers, *and then expressed as wffs of FOL*.

1. “*x is divisible by y*”: $y \mid x \Leftrightarrow \exists z \ x = y \times z$

2. $\text{IsPrime}(x) \Leftrightarrow \neg \exists z (z \neq 1 \wedge z \neq x \wedge z \mid x)$

8. $x \circ y$ corresponds to the operation of concatenating" two finite sequences of numbers.

9. $seq(x)$ corresponds to the number sequence that consists only of the number x

10. $paren(x) = seq(1) \circ x \circ seq(3)$

13. $not(x) \iff seq(9) \circ x$

14. $or(x, y) \Leftrightarrow paren(x) \circ seq(11) \circ paren(x)$

...

23. x is a wff

...

34. x is a Peano axiom

...

45. “ x is a proof of y ” ProofOf(x, y)

(x is the Gödel number of a proof (in F+, using the Peano axioms as premises) of the sentence whose code number is y .)

“y is provable” : $\exists x \text{ ProofOf}(x, y)$

“y is not provable” : $\neg \exists x \text{ ProofOf}(x, y)$

The Diagonal Lemma

If $P(x)$ is a wff with one free variable, then there is some natural number d such that d is the code number for $P(d)$.

- But $\neg \exists x \text{ ProofOf}(x, y)$ is a wff with one free variable!
- Hence, there is some “diagonal” number g such that g is the code number of the sentence:

$$\neg \exists x \text{ ProofOf}(x, g).$$

- This sentence says, “I am not provable”

